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THE TRANSITION TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS, AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES 
By DAVID HOPE and ANGELO MARTELLI
*
ABSTRACT 
The transition from Fordism to the knowledge economy in the advanced democracies was 
underpinned by the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution. The introduction 
and rapid diffusion of ICT pushed up wages for college-educated workers with complementary skills and 
allowed top managers and CEOs to reap greater rewards for their talents. Despite these common 
pressures, income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere; the Anglo-Saxon countries 
stand out as being particularly unequal. To shed new light on this puzzle, we carry out a panel data 
analysis of 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 2007. The analysis stands apart from the existing 
empirical literature by taking a comparative perspective. We look at the extent to which the relationship 
between the knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labour market 
institutions. We find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively associated with both 
the 90–10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1%, but that these effects are mitigated by the 
presence of strong labour market institutions, such as coordinated wage bargaining, strict employment 
protection legislation, high union density, and high collective bargaining coverage. The study provides 
robust evidence against the argument that industrial relations systems are no longer important 
safeguards of wage solidarity in the knowledge economy. 
Keywords: knowledge economy, income inequality, labour market institutions, industrial relations 
systems, technological change
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The last forty years has seen a pervasive rise in income inequality across the advanced 
democracies of Western Europe, North America and the Asia–Pacific region,
1
 especially at the 
very top of the income distribution.
2
 This occurred alongside major structural change, which 
saw these economies transition from Fordism—an economic system built around the mass 
production and mass consumption of standardized consumer goods—to the knowledge 
economy, where service sectors dominate economic activity and human capital is central to 
economic prosperity.
3
 
The two phenomena are intimately linked. The information and communications 
technology (ICT) revolution that underpinned the transition to the knowledge economy 
increased the demand for college-educated workers with complementary skills, which led to a 
rise in the wage premia for more educated workers.
4
 The effects on wage dispersion were further 
compounded by the increasing automation of occupations focusing on routine tasks.
5
 The ICT 
revolution and globalization also allowed top managers, CEOs, and entrepreneurs to apply 
their talents to a much wider pool of resources and to reach a substantially larger audience 
than possible in previous generations. The rapidly rising compensation of the top 1% in the 
knowledge economy therefore reflects both the increasing complexity of their work and their 
enhanced ability to reap the rewards of their talents.
6
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 2 
The transition to the knowledge economy began in earnest after the crisis of Fordism in 
the 1970s. Figure 1 shows the employment expansion in knowledge-intensive service sectors, 
such as finance, insurance, business services and telecommunications, between 1970 and 2006.
7
 
We can see that the growth of knowledge employment was ubiquitous in the advanced 
democracies over this period; the average employment expansion was close to 9 percentage 
points. The rise of the knowledge economy is clearly demonstrated by this substantial shift in 
economic structure away from traditional industries and towards ICT-intensive service 
sectors.
8
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE EXPANSION OF EMPLOYMENT IN KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE SERVICES IN 
ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES BETWEEN 1970 AND 2006 
Note: Knowledge-intensive services combines three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; 
and renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities. 
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; O’Mahony 
and Timmer (2009). 
 
                                         
7
 See Section III for a detailed explanation of our measure of knowledge-intensive services. 
8
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 3 
While the transition to the knowledge economy has put upward pressure on inequality in all 
the advanced democracies, we have observed striking differences in the inequality trajectories 
of different economies. When looking at the evolution of two widely-used measures of income 
inequality—the income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 wage ratio—it is clear that 
inequality has grown more rapidly in the English-speaking countries than in the continental 
and northern European economies.
9
 
The UK and the US particularly stand out. The top 1% income share was 7% in the UK 
in 1970, but had risen to 15% by 2006. The US saw an even more striking change, with the 
share rising from 11% to 20% over the same period. As we might expect, the UK and the US 
also saw large employment expansions in knowledge-intensive services. The two countries that 
saw the biggest movement into knowledge-intensive services, however, were the Netherlands 
and Belgium, where the growth of inequality has been much more subdued. In the Netherlands, 
for example, the top 1% income share was under 7% in 2006. On top of this, the other 
continental and northern Europe economies saw equivalent or greater expansions in knowledge-
intensive services than the other English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada and Ireland), 
but experienced substantially smaller upswings in inequality. This leaves us with a clear puzzle: 
given the common pressures from the transition to the knowledge economy, why has income 
inequality not risen to the same extent across the advanced democracies? 
Despite the wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence on how labour markets and 
inequality have been affected by technological progress, there are only a few cross-country 
empirical analyses that estimate the effects of the transition to the knowledge economy on 
income inequality in the advanced democracies.
10
 These studies use a range of different 
                                         
9
 See Figure S1 in the online supplementary materials; Hope and Martelli 2019. See also Atkinson and Piketty 
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 4 
measures of the knowledge economy and income inequality, but typically find that the 
expansion of knowledge-intensive employment is positively associated with income inequality.
11
 
This emerging empirical literature has advanced our understanding of the relationship between 
the knowledge economy and income inequality, but cannot account for why some advanced 
democracies have managed to simultaneously expand employment in knowledge-intensive 
services and maintain relatively high wage solidarity across the workforce, while others have 
not. 
The analysis in this paper aims to shed new light on this puzzle by taking a comparative 
perspective. There is a large body of empirical work in comparative political economy that 
finds that labour market institutions, such as coordinated wage bargaining, trade unions, and 
employment protection legislation, help restrain dispersion in the distribution of income.
12
 
There has yet to be a cross-country empirical study, however, that investigates whether labour 
market institutions can diminish the effects of the transition to the knowledge economy on 
income inequality. 
We fill this gap in the literature by carrying out a panel data econometric analysis using 
an unbalanced dataset that covers 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. We investigate 
whether the effect of the knowledge economy on income inequality varies across countries with 
different labour market institutions. The results show that the expansion of employment in 
knowledge-intensive services increases income inequality, but that this effect is mitigated by 
the presence of coordinated wage setting, strict employment protection legislation, and high 
bargaining coverage. While we find that union density mitigates increases in earnings 
                                         
11
 The exception to this is Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017, who find a significant negative effect of knowledge-
intensive services on top incomes. This finding and the issues around the measurement of the knowledge economy 
will be discussed further in Section III. 
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2003; Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata 2007; Jaumotte and Buitron 2015; Martelli 2017; Huber, Huo, and 
Stephens 2017. 
 5 
dispersion as result of the transition to the knowledge economy, it is the only labour market 
institution that does not also lessen increases in top income shares. 
Our results show that industrial relations systems have played a significant part in keeping 
income inequality in check in continental and northern Europe during the transition to the 
knowledge economy. The findings complement recent work that emphasizes the role that (often 
heavily reformulated) industrial relations systems have played in sustaining more egalitarian 
labour market outcomes in the knowledge economy in Scandinavia.
13
 
The results stand in stark contrast, however, to Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell’s 
argument that due to the common trajectory of liberalization among advanced democracies, 
industrial relations institutions have a greatly diminished capacity to achieve egalitarian 
outcomes in the post-Fordist era.
14
 Our findings also call into question the related argument 
that industrial relations systems have been superseded by redistribution and education 
spending as the main safeguards against income inequality in the knowledge economy.
15
 
 
II. THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS, AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
The post-industrial era has been marked by a dramatic increase in income inequality within 
the advanced democracies. The richest households in society have typically pulled away from 
the rest,
16
 and incomes have become more dispersed across the spectrum.
17
 Within this general 
trend, there have also been marked cross-country differences, with the Anglo-Saxon countries 
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 6 
typically seeing the greatest rises.
18
 Identifying the factors driving national income inequality 
has risen to the top of the agenda for many scholars and policy makers, especially in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. A large theoretical and empirical literature across the fields of 
economics, political science, and sociology, has identified many potential explanations for the 
changes observed in income inequality in the advanced democracies. 
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz suggest that educational investment (i.e. the supply 
of skills) has not kept pace with technological advancement (i.e. the demand for skills) in the 
US, which has put upward pressure on the wages of skilled workers.
19
 Evelyn Huber and John 
Stephens find evidence supporting the Goldin–Katz hypothesis in a wider panel data analysis 
of OECD economies.
20
 The supply and demand of skills is likely to be less important for 
explaining the diverging income of the top 1%, however, as mass systems of higher education 
have provided a substantial proportion of the workforce with a college education. Facundo 
Alvaredo, Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez instead find that tax 
policy, changes in the bargaining power of managers and employees, the greater 
individualisation of pay, and capital income, are more salient for explaining changes in the 
income share of the top 1%.
21
 In a panel data study of 16 OECD countries over the entire 20
th
 
century, Jesper Roine, Jonas Vlachos, and Daniel Waldenström find that top income shares 
are boosted by rapid economic growth and financial development, and reined in by banking 
crises and the progressivity of the tax system.
22
 Turning to an influential political science 
analysis on the rise of top incomes in the United States, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson point 
to the profound role of government policy in creating the current “winner-take-all” pattern, 
                                         
18 Acemoglu 2003; Atkinson and Piketty 2007; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; Lemieux 2011. 
19
 Goldin and Katz 2007; Goldin and Katz 2008. 
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 7 
and highlight the remarkable ability of the most affluent households and lobbyists representing 
their interests to shape public policy in their favour.
23
 
Financialization—the increasing influence over economic policymaking and economic 
outcomes of financial markets and financial actors
24
—has been identified in a number of 
national and cross-country empirical studies as another important driver of both greater wage 
disparities and the concentration of income in the most affluent households.
25
 Financialization 
has both direct and indirect effects on inequality. Workers in the finance sector are typically 
much better remunerated than the average worker.
26
 The spread of shareholder value 
maximisation models of corporate governance in the financial and non-financial sector 
privileges short-term profits and encourages cost cutting and mass layoffs that 
disproportionately affect ordinary workers.
27
 Relatedly, Ken-Huo Lin and Donald Tomaskovic-
Devey provide strong empirical evidence that the increasing reliance of non-financial firms in 
the United States on earnings realized through financial channels has led firm surpluses to be 
split more in favour of managers and owners, which has significantly contributed to rises in 
earnings dispersion and top executives’ share of total compensation.
28
 Financialization can also 
weaken labour market institutions that act to constrain inequality, such as unions, centralized 
wage bargaining, and employment protection legislation.
29
 Recent contributions from Thibault 
Darcillon and Anthony Roberts and Roy Kwon have also found evidence that labour market 
institutions can effectively moderate the effects of financialization on income inequality.
30
 
                                         
23
 Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hacker and Pierson 2011. 
24 Palley 2013. 
25
 Kus 2012; Flaherty 2015; Assa 2012; Godechot 2016. 
26 Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Philippon and Reshef 2012. 
27 Fligstein and Shin 2007; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Kus 2012. 
28 Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013. 
29 Palley 2013; Darcillon 2015; Meyer 2017. 
30 Darcillon 2016; Roberts and Kwon 2017. See also, Kwon, Roberts, and Zingula 2017. 
 8 
Other scholars have highlighted the rise in international trade liberalizations, finding that 
trade tariffs reductions led to increased inequality.
31
 Cross-country studies on inequality and 
globalization have found that measures of trade and capital account integration, such as 
southern import penetration and outward investment flows, have significant positive effects 
on within-country inequality, but are less pertinent to explaining cross-country differences.
32
 
Although, Cheol-Sung Lee, François Nielsen, and Arthur Alderson find that these globalization 
effects are mitigated in countries with larger public sectors.
33
 
Despite the wide-ranging explanations put forward for changes in income inequality, 
technological change and labour market institutions remain the two dominant factors in the 
literature. These two factors are the focus of our paper. In the remainder of the literature 
review, we look at the direct effects of technological change and labour market institutions on 
income inequality, before turning to the potential interaction effect between the two factors 
that is at the heart of our empirical analysis. 
 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND INEQUALITY 
The advanced democracies have undergone a major technologically-driven structural 
transformation since the 1970s. The common overarching narrative among comparative 
political economists is that the advanced economies have transitioned from the Fordist 
manufacturing system of the post-WWII golden age to the knowledge economy of the post-
industrial era.
34
 The Fordist system was built on the dual pillars of mass production and mass 
consumption, and was supported by collective bargaining, a generous welfare state, and 
                                         
31
 Milanovic and Squire 2005. 
32
 Alderson and Nielsen 2002. 
33
 Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007. 
34 See, for example, Thelen 2014; Iversen and Soskice 2015; Ibsen and Thelen 2017. 
 9 
Keynesian demand management policies. This system collapsed under the weight of short-term 
factors, such as industrial conflict and oil price shocks, and longer term factors, such as 
globalization, de-unionization, and technological change.
35
 The knowledge economy that arose 
in its place is distinct from what went before in a number of ways. Manufacturing has receded 
in importance and service sectors now dominate economic activity. Complementarities in 
production between skilled and semi-skilled workers have been replaced by complementarities 
between skilled workers and new information and communication technologies. These changes 
have brought about a huge increase in skill and education levels of big segments of the labour 
force, facilitated through the rapid expansion of higher education.
36
 The welfare state, 
collective bargaining and labour unions have generally declined in importance over time, but 
there are still significant and theoretically salient differences in labour market institutions and 
welfare states among the advanced democracies in the knowledge economy.
37
 
Of course, the CPE perspective on structural change glosses over substantive cross-
national differences. For example, Fordism was certainly not the same everywhere.
38
 As Torben 
Iversen and David Soskice concede in their influential paper on distribution and redistribution 
in the knowledge economy, Fordism “took on more or less skill-intensive forms and economies 
of scale were important to different degrees”.
39
 What is important for the purposes of research 
into the relationship between the knowledge economy and income inequality, however, is that 
the advanced democracies economies have faced a similar set of secular trends since the 1970s 
(e.g. technological change, deindustrialization, and globalization) that have put upward 
                                         
35
 Hope and Soskice 2016. 
36
 Iversen and Soskice 2015. 
37
 Pontusson 2005; Schneider and Paunescu 2012; Iversen and Soskice 2012; Thelen 2014. 
38 This is especially true for the late-developing peripheral Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain), as will be discussed further in Section III. 
39 Iversen and Soskice 2015, 194. 
 10 
pressure on income inequality through a number of common channels, such as the rising skill 
premium for highly educated workers, worsening labour market dualization, the expansion of 
temporary and precarious work, and the shrinking core of unionized production workers.
40
 
The information and communication technology (ICT) revolution that underpinned the 
transition to the knowledge economy has been found to be a key driver behind the upward 
trend of earnings inequality since the 1980s. Wen-Hao Chen, Michael Förster, and Ana Llena-
Nozal carry out a cross-national study into the drivers of inequality in OECD countries and 
find that technological change (measured by ICT intensity, R&D expenditure, and patents) 
significantly widens wage dispersion and accounts for more of the within-country variation in 
inequality than trade or financial factors.
41
 In a complementary panel data study covering 51 
countries between 1981 and 2003, Florence Jaumotte, Subir Lall, and Chris Papageorgiou find 
that technological progress exerts a greater impact than trade or financial globalization on 
income inequality.
42
 
The diffusion of ICT throughout the advanced democracies created a sharp upturn in 
demand for college-educated workers, because their high-level, general skills are complements 
in production to ICT. The additional demand for skilled workers that came with these new 
technologies led to a rise in the relative wages of more educated workers.
43
 The losers from 
technological change have typically been those workers in the middle of the skill distribution, 
whose jobs focus on routine tasks that can be easily be replicated by computers or machines.
44
 
                                         
40 Palier and Thelen 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Iversen and Soskice 2015; Ibsen and Thelen 2017. 
41
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 11 
The knowledge economy also contributed to the rapid rise in the income of the top 1% 
during the post-industrial era. Kevin Murphy and Ja ́n Za ́bojni ́k provide a market-based 
explanation for the explosion of CEO pay in the knowledge economy, arguing that the skills 
needed to manage a modern corporation are much more focused on general, transferable skills 
(e.g. management, economics, accounting, computing etc.) than the firm-specific knowledge 
that was important in the pre-digital era, and this has created a highly competitive global 
market for the best CEOs.
45
 In a study of over 2,500 publicly traded firms, Kim and 
Brynjolfsson find that information technology intensity strongly predicts CEO pay.
46
 Building 
on Garicano and Rossi-Hanberg’s argument,
47
 they argue that IT increases the ‘effective size’ 
of the firm that the CEO runs, due to the greater information available for decision-making, 
the enhanced ability for the CEO’s decisions to be passed through the business hierarchy, and 
greater scope for monitoring and enforcing those decisions. 
The integration of capital and goods markets that came with ICT and globalization also 
allows highly-talented managers, CEOs and entrepreneurs to operate in more markets and 
reach more customers. The rapidly rising compensation of the top 1% in the knowledge 
economy therefore reflects both their superior ability to reap the rewards of their talents and 
the greater complexity of their roles.
48
 An aspect of the knowledge economy, particularly in 
new digital technologies, that reinforces this dynamic is the existence of large networks effects, 
whereby the value of a product rises the greater number of users it has (e.g. social media 
platforms). Network effects often lead to the creation of winner-take-all or winner-take-most 
markets, where the first mover gets a disproportionate amount of the returns in an industry.
49
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 Murphy and Za ́bojni ́k 2004. 
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 Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Mankiw 2013; Kaplan and Rauh 2013. 
49
 Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014. 
 12 
This also ties into recent work finding that trends in the personal and functional distributions 
of income in the United States are being increasingly driven by greater earnings dispersion 
among firms, with ‘superstar’ firms in knowledge-intensive industries, such as finance, 
technology, and business services, making higher profits and paying considerably higher wages 
than less productive firms within their own (and other) industries.
50 
 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY 
A wealth of empirical evidence has emerged that institutional factors, such as wage 
coordination, trade union density, collective bargaining coverage, and employment protection 
legislation, shape patterns of income inequality in the advanced democracies. The inequality 
constraining effects of labour market institutions have been found in numerous time-series
51
 
and cross-national panel studies.
52
 In a simple model in which unions bargain with employers 
over the wage, “if labour market institutions improve the outside option more for unskilled 
than for skilled workers, this will strengthen their bargaining position and tend to compress 
the skill wage differential”.
53
  The theoretical channel could be argued to apply to the full range 
of labour market institutions, but as Winfried Koeniger, Marco Leonardi, and Luca Nunziata 
freely admit, labour market institutions are complex and multifaceted, and are also likely to 
affect wage differentials through many other channels.
54
 The remainder of this subsection will 
therefore address the literature on each labour market institution in turn. 
                                         
50
 Autor et al. 2017a, 2017b; Barth et al. 2016; Song et al. 2015. 
51 Mosher 2007; Kristal and Cohen 2007; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Kristal and Cohen 2017. 
52 Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Brady and Leicht 2008; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Pontusson, Rueda, 
and Way 2002; Wallerstein 1999; Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata 2007; Iversen 1999. 
53 Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata 2007, 341. 
54 Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata 2007. 
 13 
In an empirical study of OECD countries, Wallerstein finds that “the more wage and 
salaries are set in a centralized manner, the more egalitarian the distribution of wages and 
salaries”.
5556
 The three theoretical channels that Wallerstein identifies as explaining this 
relationship are the economic explanation (i.e. wage differentials in decentralized wage-setting 
systems are inefficient), the political explanation (i.e. compressed wages in centralized wage-
setting systems reflect the preferences of the median wage-earner), and the norms explanation 
(i.e. centralized bargaining influences norms around fairness).
57
 The importance of wage 
coordination is also emphasized in other empirical studies. Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn’s 
much cited analysis finds that decentralized wage-setting systems in the US provide the most 
persuasive explanation for the higher level of wage inequality in the US than in the other 
OECD countries.
58
 Focusing on Israel, Tali Kristal and Yinon Cohen find that decentralization 
explains a significant part of the escalating earnings inequality since 1970, with the reduction 
in the use of extension orders and the spread of local agreements highlighted as particularly 
salient factors.
59
 
There is substantial evidence that labour unions, in their role as both wage bargainers 
and political actors, influence class-based inequity in politics and public policy, and therefore 
reduce economic disparities.
60
 David Card, Thomas Lemieux, and Craig Riddell find that in 
Canada, the UK, and the US, unions have an equalizing effect on the dispersion of male wages 
across skill groups, as they flatten the wages of union workers—who are concentrated in the 
middle of the income distribution—relative to non-union workers, as well as compressing the 
                                         
55
 Wallerstein 1999, 676. 
56 Although Golden and Londregan 2006 reanalyze Wallerstein’s data and find the effect of bargaining 
centralization on wage equality is only one-sixth the magnitude of Wallerstein’s estimates. 
57
 Wallerstein 1999. 
58 Blau and Kahn 1996. 
59 Kristal and Cohen 2007. 
60
 Ahlquist 2017. 
 14 
wages of union members.
61
 Card finds similar effects in a micro data study on the United 
States, with union decline accounting for 15-20% of the rise in male income inequality between 
the early 1970s and the early 1990s.
62
 It is also argued that unions help to institutionalize 
norms of equity.
63
 Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld present evidence in line with this theory, 
showing that non-union wages are less dispersed in highly unionized industries and regions in 
the United States.
64
  
The strength of unions and their bargaining power can be measured in two ways, either 
through union density (unions members as proportion of wage and salary earners) or 
bargaining coverage (employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreement as a 
proportion of wage and salary earners). While the two measures are often closely related, this 
is not always the case. France, for example, had bargaining coverage of 98% in 2012, but union 
density of below 8%.
65
 Looking at both measures therefore provides a fuller picture. Existing 
cross-country empirical studies predominantly focus on union density, due to its superior data 
availability.
66
 A notable exception is Stefan Thewissen, Olaf van Vliet, and Chen Wang, who 
argue that bargaining coverage will be negatively associated with earnings inequality, because 
wages vary less between workers when more of the workforce are covered by bargaining 
agreements.
67
 They find strong evidence supporting their hypothesis in an analysis of sectoral 
earnings inequality in 18 OECD countries.
68
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  The richest households in the advanced democracies are unlikely to be union members 
or covered by collective bargaining agreements, but this does not mean their incomes are 
unaffected by the strength of labour unions.
69
 Unions can serve as an important check on 
executive compensation by instituting fairness norms, reducing the resources available for high 
executive pay (through higher worker wages), restraining the use of stock options in CEO pay, 
and lessening the need for highly paid managers and supervisors (due to greater worker 
discretion and performance in unionized workplaces).
70
 In fact, there is a strong negative 
relationship in the United States between union presence and CEO compensation.
71
 Given the 
major role that executive compensation plays in the income share of the top 1%, it is 
unsurprising that cross-country studies also consistently find a negative relationship between 
union density and top 1% income shares.
72
 
As well as industrial relations systems, there is evidence that employment protection 
legislation (EPL) can influence the distribution of income. Daniele Checchi and Cecilia García-
Peñalosa find that OECD countries with stricter employment protection legislation, where 
workers are much harder to fire, typically have lower levels of household income inequality.
73
 
EPL has been argued to reduce wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, as the 
substantial fixed cost component means EPL offers greater protection to unskilled workers.
74
 
It has also been shown that EPL is associated with lower use of incentive pay,
75
 which is likely 
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to reduce income inequality, due to the positive association between the use of incentive pay 
schemes, such as bonus pay and commissions, and wage inequality.
76
 
 
THE INTERACTION OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY 
The previous two subsections have highlighted the vast literature on the direct effects of the 
transition to the knowledge economy and labour market institutions on income inequality in 
advanced democracies. These two dominant explanations for rising income inequality are 
commonly viewed as distinct and competing in the literature. In fact, several recent 
contributions have aimed to empirically assess the relative importance of the two channels.
77
 
Kristal and Cohen analyse industry-level data from the United States and find that weakening 
institutions (unions and minimum wages) explain around half of the rise in wage inequality 
since the late 1960s, whereas computerization only explains about a quarter.
78
 A time-series 
study using aggregate data came to the opposite conclusion, with the effect of ICT investment 
outstripping that of the declining unionization rate.
79
 Looking across the OECD countries 
using panel data, the OECD finds that institutions are the more important factor.
80
 It is clear 
that the results of studies weighing up the two explanations are dependent on the empirical 
approach taken. What all these studies fail to take into account—and one possible source of 
their lack of consensus—is the potential interaction effects between labour market institutions 
and the expansion of the knowledge economy. 
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 Whether the relationship between the expansion of knowledge-intensive services and 
income inequality depends on national labour market institutions has received relatively little 
attention in the literature to date. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no cross-
national empirical studies that investigate whether labour market institutions are able to 
mitigate the inequality-enhancing effects of the transition to the knowledge economy. Despite 
the lack of panel data analyses into the relationship, the literature has identified several 
theoretical arguments that provide clear motivation for focusing our study on this interaction. 
The divergence of US and continental European wage inequality and the beginnings of 
the ICT revolution meant the 1990s were a fertile ground for economic theories looking to 
explain cross-country differences in labour market outcomes. The influential “Krugman 
hypothesis” suggested that the answer lie in labour market institutions.
81
 While both the US 
and continental Europe were subject to the same skills-biased technical change, stronger labour 
market institutions in continental Europe, such as unions and employment protection, meant 
that these countries were better able to contain wage dispersion, but only at the expense of 
low-skilled employment. While intuitive and persuasive, the Krugman hypothesis was not 
adequately supported by the empirical evidence. It implied that employment losses in 
continental Europe should be concentrated in low-skilled occupations, but on closer inspection, 
the labour market statistics showed that employment losses were relatively evenly distributed 
across skills groups.
82
 
 An alternative theory that better fit the stylized facts was put forward in a series of 
papers by Daron Acemoglu and Jörn-Steffen Pischke around the turn of the century.
83
 The 
core of their argument was that human and physical capital investment decisions by firms are 
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dependent on labour market institutions. In the face of the expansion of the world technology 
frontier that occurred with the ICT revolution, countries with institutions that compress 
wages, such as unions and coordinated wage bargaining, should see relatively more investment 
in both worker training and technologies complementary to low-skilled labour. In countries 
where these institutions are absent, investment instead shifts toward technologies 
complementary to high-skilled workers. These effects occur because technological change 
provides different investment incentives for firms depending on the extent to which labour 
market institutions (or other factors) compress the wage structure. 
This implies less skills-biased technical change in countries with strong labour market 
institutions, and consequently, less of a rise in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers. Building on the analyses in their previous work, Pischke presents empirical evidence 
that accords with their theory, showing that on-the-job training and physical capital 
investments were more focused on high-skilled workers in the US than Europe during the 
1980s, when wage inequality dramatically diverged on either side of the Atlantic.
84
 In a 
complementary empirical analysis, Koeniger and Leonardi compare the effect of capital 
investment on wage inequality using industry-level data from Germany, with strong labour 
market institutions, and the US, with flexible labour markets.
85
 They find that capital 
deepening pushed up wage differentials more than 7% in US industries during the 1980s, but 
due to investment being directed more toward unskilled workers, capital deepening actually 
reduced wage differentials in German industries by 5-7% over the same period. 
More recent work by the sociologist Daniel Oesch and co-authors in the tradition of 
Acemoglu and Pischke argues that whether technological change leads to upgrading (as seen 
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in northern Europe) or polarization (as seen in Britain and the US) depends in part on national 
labour market institutions and welfare regimes.
86
 Institutions that prop up the wages of low-
skilled workers provide an incentive for firms to invest in skills and technologies to enhance 
the productivity of the interpersonal service workers that are typically located at the bottom 
of the skill and income distribution in the knowledge economy (for example, by introducing 
self-service checkouts in supermarkets).
87
 Hence, Oesch sees institutions as mitigating the 
relationship between the expansion of the knowledge economy and rising income inequality. 
Caroline Lloyd, Claudia Weinkopf, and Rosemary Batt find further evidence of this type of 
interaction effect in a multi-country case study of call centre workers in Europe.
88
 Through a 
series of in-depth interviews and workplace observations, they discover that call centre 
employees in the United Kingdom, which has few labour market protections and little collective 
representation, are less skilled, have less complex and diverse roles, and are paid less relative 
to the median, than call centre employees in Denmark and France. 
In research focusing specifically on whether national labour market institutions shape the 
response of employment structures to technological change in Europe, Angelo Martelli finds 
that EPL effectively mitigates employment losses in industries and occupations that are 
susceptible to routinization (the replacement of labour carrying out routine tasks with 
computers or machines).
89
 In contrast, union density was not found to alleviate the effects of 
routinization on the employment structure. Martelli also looks at how EPL affects wage 
inequality, finding that it restricts dispersion in the upper tail of the earnings distribution 
(90/50), while raising dispersion in the lower tail of the earnings distribution (50/10). He finds 
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that the former effect is larger in magnitude, so EPL both contains the wage effects of 
routinization and compresses the overall wage distribution (i.e. the 90–10 wage ratio). 
Roberts and Kwon look at whether the impact of financialization on income inequality 
differs across varieties of capitalism.
90
 One of their measures of financialization is the 
employment share of the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors. Finance and 
insurance are knowledge-intensive industries that make extensive use of ICT, so their results 
are relevant for our study. They find that financialization increases wage dispersion and top 
incomes more in liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the Anglo-Saxon countries, than 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as the northern European countries. LMEs have 
lower employment protection, weaker collective bargaining, and more shareholder orientated 
corporate governance, which make them more amenable to profit-making strategies that rely 
on short-termism, cost-cutting (including mass layoffs), and non-production (i.e. financial) 
activities.
91
 
Labour market institutions can also restrain the incomes of the most affluent workers in 
knowledge-based industries. As we saw earlier in the literature review, top managers and CEOs 
roles grew more complex with the ICT revolution, which put upward pressure on their 
compensation.
92
 Knowledge-intensive industries, such as technology and finance, are 
particularly ICT intensive, and are prone to winner-take-all markets and a disproportionate 
share of income and profits going to the most productive ‘superstar firms’.
93
 Hacker and 
Pierson (alongside many others) argue that labour unions have the organizational and financial 
resources, as well as the motivation, to rein in the compensation of executives and ensure 
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packages are structured in the interests of the firm as a whole and not just management.
94
 It 
follows that countries with stronger labour market institutions are likely to be better placed 
to contain the rise in executive compensation from the ICT revolution and the shift of 
employment into knowledge-intensive industries. Hacker and Pierson also argue that organized 
labour focuses on the broad concerns of those on modest incomes and can help ensure that 
public policy does not simply represent the interests of the rich. In the shift to the knowledge 
economy, one could think of financial deregulation and tax policies as salient political conflicts 
that had dramatic implications for the distribution of income.
95
 
 
III. DATA AND MEASURES 
Our empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel dataset covering 18 OECD countries from 
1970 to 2007. The countries included in the sample—Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US—vary markedly in their industrial relations systems,
96
 and 
more broadly, in the organization of their political economies.
97
 
As alluded to earlier, Fordism did not take the same form in all the advanced democracies 
in the sample, especially in the late-developing peripheral Eurozone countries.
98
 However, at 
the start of the sample period in 1970, manufacturing employment was similarly important to 
the peripheral Eurozone countries as it was in many of the higher-income OECD countries, 
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such as Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United States (as shown in Table 1). During 
the period under analysis, the 18 countries faced the same secular trends (technological change, 
deindustrialization, and globalization) and without exception saw employment shift out of 
manufacturing and into (among other sectors) knowledge-intensive services (see Table 1). The 
combination of common structural changes and cross-country variation in knowledge 
employment, labour market institutions and income inequality, make these countries a suitable 
sample for this study. The sample also closely aligns with previous cross-country empirical 
analyses that estimate the relationship between knowledge employment and income 
inequality.
99
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TABLE 1 
EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN MANUFACTURING AND KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE 
SERVICES, 1970 & 2006 
 
Employment in manufacturing  
(as a % of total employment) 
Employment in knowledge-intensive 
services (as a % of total employment) 
 1970 2006 1970 2006 
Australia 26.5% 10.2% 8.4% 16.3% 
Austria 22.3% 14.9% 4.8% 14.3% 
Belgium 30.8% 13.9% 9.2% 20.6% 
Canada 22.1% 11.8% 7.3% 13.8% 
Denmark 25.9% 13.8% 7.4% 15.6% 
Finland 23.0% 17.9% 4.8% 12.7% 
France 25.1% 13.0% 9.0% 18.8% 
Germany 35.3% 19.1% 7.0% 17.0% 
Greece 19.2% 13.4% 4.6% 11.0% 
Ireland 20.9% 13.3% 5.5% 14.2% 
Italy 27.6% 20.2% 4.7% 15.0% 
Japan 26.0% 17.4% 5.7% 14.6% 
Netherlands 23.9% 11.0% 10.8% 21.8% 
Portugal 22.8% 17.7% 3.4% 8.4% 
Spain 22.2% 15.6% 3.8% 10.7% 
Sweden 27.8% 16.1% 5.9% 14.7% 
United Kingdom 31.7% 10.9% 9.8% 20.1% 
United States 21.7% 10.0% 10.5% 19.2% 
Note: Knowledge-intensive services comprise three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; 
and renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities. 
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; O’Mahony 
and Timmer (2009). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
We use two measures of income inequality as our dependent variables, which allows us to test 
the effects of our key independent variables on different parts of the income distribution. The 
first is the income share of the top 1% from the World Wealth and Income Database.
100
 The 
second is the 90–10 wage ratio, which is the ratio of gross earnings received by a worker at the 
90th earnings percentile to that received by a worker at the 10
th
 earnings percentile. This is 
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taken from the OECD Labour Force Statistics.
101
 Both our income inequality measures are 
before taxes and transfers (i.e. prior to government redistribution), which is appropriate for a 
study looking at the effects of the knowledge economy and labour market institutions on 
income inequality—i.e. we focus on distribution rather than redistribution. 
The main reason we choose these two measures of income inequality is because they most 
closely match the theoretical channels identified in the literature review. Acemoglu and 
Pischke’s theoretical models focus on the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour 
and the empirical analyses in their work commonly utilize the 90–10 wage ratio to test their 
theories.
102
 The literature also shows that inequality at the very top of the income distribution 
is heavily influenced by the compensation of entrepreneurs, top managers, and CEOs.
103
 The 
top 1% income share is the most accurate inequality measure available for capturing the 
earnings of the most affluent people in society. It is calculated using tax returns, and because 
it avoids top coding, it captures income growth at the very top of the income distribution 
much better than traditional measures based on household surveys.
104
 In addition to theoretical 
considerations, these measures have superior data availability over other measures of income 
inequality, especially over time, which is crucial for panel data analysis. We also want our 
results to contribute to the wider empirical literature on the determinants of income inequality 
in the advanced democracies, where the 90–10 wage ratio
105
 and the income share of the 1%
106
 
are two of the most frequently used measures of inequality. 
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The data availability, and therefore the samples, vary slightly for the two measures. The 
sample for the regression models using the top 1% income share covers 15 countries (no data 
is available from the World Wealth and Income Database for Austria, Belgium or Greece) and 
541 country-year observations. The sample for the regression models using the 90–10 wage 
ratio covers all 18 countries, but as this measure typically has shorter time series, the sample 
only has 322 country-year observations. Full details of the country-year coverage for our 
dependent variables are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The measure of the knowledge economy used in our study follows Anne Wren’s definition of 
dynamic services, which combines the sectors that have seen the greatest diffusion of new 
information and communications technologies.
107
 Table 2 uses EUKLEMS data to show the 
average contribution to value added growth of ICT capital services across 16 sectors for 12 
advanced democracies between 1983 and 2006. Three sectors stand out as having significantly 
higher ICT contributions than the others: post and telecommunications, financial 
intermediation (covering finance and insurance), and renting of machinery and equipment and 
other business activities (which is dominated by business services such as legal, technical, 
computer, and advertising services). Our measure of knowledge-intensive services adds up 
employment in these three sectors from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 
and expresses it as a percentage of total employment.
108
 Data on knowledge intensive-
employment for the 18 countries in our sample is available from 1970 – 2007.
109
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Knowledge-intensive services have other characteristics that set them apart from the other 
service sectors. Wren finds that they typically have higher productivity growth and are more 
likely to be traded internationally.
110
 This is no coincidence. The ICT revolution has drastically 
reduced the cost of performing routine, programmable tasks,
111
 which has pushed up 
productivity in ICT-intensive sectors.
112
 It has also lowered many of the technical barriers to 
trade in services, because digitized information can be almost costlessly stored and transported 
across the globe.
113
 
Previous studies that estimate the effects of the knowledge economy on income inequality 
have also constructed measures of knowledge employment from sectoral data. Daniela 
Rohrbach and Evelyn Huber, Jingjing Huo, and John Stephens sum employment in sectors 
they deem to be knowledge-intensive (using OECD STAN and EUKLEMS data 
respectively).
114
 These authors select different sectors. Rohrbach includes high-tech 
manufacturing industries in her definition,
115
 whereas Huber, Huo, and Stephens focus solely 
on services.
116
 Huber, Huo, and Stephens measure includes sectors that are traditionally 
dominated by government provision, such as public administration, health and education.
117
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TABLE 2 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ICT CAPITAL SERVICES TO VALUE ADDED GROWTH 
ACROSS SECTORS IN 12 ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES, 1983 – 2006 
Sector 
Average contribution of ICT 
capital services to value added 
growth (percentage points) 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.074 
Mining and quarrying 0.205 
Manufacturing 0.411 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.401 
Construction 0.169 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.558 
Hotels and restaurants 0.269 
Transport and storage 0.487 
Post and telecommunications 1.739 
Financial intermediation 1.512 
Real estate activities 0.126 
Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities  1.173 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.427 
Education 0.237 
Health and social work 0.226 
Other community, social and personal services 0.569 
Note:  The advanced democracies included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; O’Mahony 
and Timmer (2009). 
 
We believe Wren’s measure of the knowledge employment is superior to these alternative 
measures for three main reasons.
118
 First, the sectors picked out by Wren have seen dramatic 
employment expansion across the advanced democracies since the collapse of the Fordist 
system (see Figure 1). Second, the knowledge-intensive sectors are selected through a 
transparent data-driven procedure (see Table 2). Lastly, the theoretical and empirical 
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literature summarised in the previous section identifies ICT as the central mechanism that 
connects the transition to the knowledge economy to changes in the income distribution.
119
 
Another approach that has been taken in past empirical work is to construct a measure 
of knowledge employment based on occupations. Kwon and Roberts utilize International 
Labour Organization data to construct a measure of knowledge employment that comprises 
managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals;
120
 occupations focusing on 
non-routine, cognitive tasks that require the type of high-level general skills that are strongly 
complementary to ICT.
121
 This measure is only available from 1980, but as a robustness test 
for our main results, we also run our analysis using this alternative measure of knowledge 
employment (as outlined in the Section IV).
122
 
The other key independent variables are the four measures of labour market institutions. 
We take the coordination of wage-setting and the adjusted bargaining (or union) coverage rate 
from the ICTWSS database.
123
 The former measures the degree of coordination of wage setting 
on a five-point scale running from firm-level bargaining through to formal or informal 
centralised bargaining that sets explicit minimum or maximum rates of wage growth. The 
latter measures the proportion of all employees with the right to bargaining that are covered 
by collective (wage) bargaining agreements. We collect data on trade union membership from 
joint database compiled by the OECD and Jelle Visser.
124
 Trade union density measures the 
proportion of employees that are members of trade unions. Finally, we use the OECD Labour 
Force Statistics measure of employment protection legislation for workers on permanent 
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contracts, which is expressed on a 0-6 scale, with higher values indicating that workers are 
harder to dismiss. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
In our models with controls, we include a selection of additional variables that have been found 
to be drivers of income inequality in the theoretical and empirical literature. The variables 
cover the broad areas of education, financialization, globalization, and the economy. 
Goldin and Katz argue that the post-industrial era in the United States has been marked 
by both a rise in the demand for higher education and a slowdown in educational expansion.
125
 
The excess demand for educated labour created by education losing the race against technology 
creates upward pressure on the wages of more educated workers. The Goldin–Katz hypothesis 
has been found to hold across the advanced democracies.
126
 We include education expenditure 
as a percentage of gross national income from The World Bank World Development Indicators 
to account for investment in human capital, and hence, increases in the supply of educated 
workers. 
Many panel data studies find that higher levels of financialization are associated with 
greater income inequality in the advanced democracies.
127
 Finance is one of the sub-sectors 
within our measure of knowledge-intensive services. To ensure that financialization is not 
driving our main results, we therefore control for stock market capitalisation as a percentage 
of GDP (from Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström) and private credit as a percentage of GDP 
(from the Financial Development and Structure Dataset).
128
 These measures control for aspects 
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of the growth of the financial sector over the post-Fordist era that affect inequality through 
different channels to those hypothesised for the broader knowledge-intensive services sector 
(as set out in the literature review), such as the increased use of stock options in the 
compensation packages of top managers and CEOs and the dramatic rise in household 
borrowing. As an additional robustness test for our main results, we also re-run our analysis 
with the financial intermediation sector excluded from our measure of knowledge employment 
(as outlined in the Section IV). 
Another secular trend that has taken place alongside the transition to the knowledge 
economy is globalization. Goods and capital markets have become considerably more 
integrated over time, which has had knock on effects for inequality. We control for two different 
aspects of globalization: outward investment flows and import competition from developing 
economies. Investment outflows are measured by outward foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of GDP. Alderson and Nielsen and Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson find that higher 
outward investment flows lead to greater income inequality.
129
 The inflow of imports from the 
global south into the advanced democracies has been one of the major features of the post-
industrial era. We follow other studies and measure southern import penetration by the value 
of manufactured goods (SITC Rev 1. 5-8) imports from developing economies as a percentage 
of GDP (calculated using data from the UN COMTRADE database and the OECD National 
Accounts).
130131
 
Lastly, we control for conditions in the labour market using the unemployment rate as a 
percentage of the civilian labour force (from the OECD Labour Force Statistics).
132
 We also 
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collected and tested a number of other potential control variables, including measures of human 
capital, partisanship, trade openness, and economic development, but as they were highly 
correlated with other explanatory variables in the dataset, they were dropped from the final 
specifications due to concerns about collinearity. 
The summary statistics for the two dependent variables, the key independent variables 
and the control variables are shown in Table 3. The small amount of missing values across the 
dataset have been linearly interpolated. The correlation matrix is shown in the Appendix 
(Table A2), as is the complete list of variable definitions and sources (Table A3).  
 
 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Top 1% income share 541 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.20 
90–10 wage ratio 322 3.04 0.67 1.88 4.86 
Knowledge employment  
(% of total employment) 
682 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.22 
Wage coordination (1 – 5 scale) 669 3.25 1.40 1.00 5.00 
Union density (%)  659 40.41 19.71 7.55 83.86 
EPL (0 – 6 scale) 414 2.20 0.99 0.26 5.00 
Bargaining coverage (0 - 100) 614 70.62 24.38 12.61 98.00 
Education expenditure (% of GNI) 684 4.63 1.32 1.00 8.29 
Stock market capitalization 
(% of GDP) 
525 0.49 0.41 0.00 2.70 
Private credit (% of GDP) 682 74.80 38.22 16.93 192.82 
Outward FDI (% of GDP) 628 2.16 3.98 -4.70 47.01 
Southern import penetration  
(% of GDP) 
661 13.78 8.17 1.11 54.15 
Unemployment rate 684 6.92 3.88 0.57 24.17 
 
 32 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The data for our analysis is unbalanced time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data covering 18 
OECD countries. We employ Prais–Winsten regressions as our empirical strategy, which have 
been widely used in the empirical literature investigating the determinants of inequality in 
advanced democracies.
133
 Prais–Winsten regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and include both panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and a correction for first-
order auto-regression. The approach helps mitigate the problems of serial correlation, group-
wise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation that are common in 
regression analyses using TSCS data.
134
 
Our empirical strategy has clear advantages over other widely used approaches. Beck and 
Katz use Monte Carlo experiments to show that for the types of TSCS data used in 
comparative politics, OLS models with panel corrected standard errors provide more accurate 
estimates of standard errors than feasible generalized least squares estimation, and entail little 
loss of efficiency.
135
 We deal with serial correlation by including a correction for first-order 
autocorrelation, which is preferable to the alternative approach of adding a lagged dependent 
variable, which would absorb much of substantively interesting variation in our TSCS data 
and risk biasing the coefficient estimates on our main independent variables.
136
 
Given that our unit of analysis in our TSCS data is countries, we also include country-
fixed effects in our regressions, which control for unobserved, time-invariant, country-specific 
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factors that influence inequality. Country fixed effects help guard against omitted variable bias 
and are commonly employed in Prais–Winsten regression models.
137
 
The equations estimated in the empirical analysis are: 
 
(1)  𝑦"# = 𝛽& + 𝛽(𝑋"# + 𝛽*𝑊"# + 𝛽,𝑋"# ∗ 𝑊"# +𝛿" + 𝜀"#		 	 	
(2)  𝑦"# = 𝛽& + 𝛽(𝑋"# + 𝛽*𝑊"# + 𝛽,𝑋"# ∗ 𝑊"# + 𝛽1 𝑍"#1 + 𝛿" + 𝜀"#.		 	
	
In both sets of models, y45 refers to our measures in income inequality: the income share of the 
top 1% and the 90–10 wage ratio. The main independent variables in the analysis are 𝑋"#, the 
share of total employment in knowledge-intensive services, and 𝑊"#, our measures of labour 
market institutions. The interaction of our main independent variables, 𝑋"# ∗ 𝑊"# , is crucial for 
testing the main hypotheses of the paper. In order to make the regression coefficients more 
easily interpretable, we mean centre the knowledge employment measure in all regression 
models. This means that the coefficients on the labour market institutions, 𝛽*, can be 
interpreted as the effect of the labour market institutions on income inequality when knowledge 
employment is at its average value in the sample. Our four labour market institutions are 
tested in separate regression models; all of which also include country-fixed effects, 𝛿", and an 
intercept term, 𝛽&. The second set of models also include a vector of 𝑘 control variables, 
represented by 𝑍"#1. 
For the reasons outlined, we believe our empirical strategy is the most appropriate for our 
TSCS data, but we make sure to check the robustness of our results to alternative 
specifications. We first re-run the analysis adding decade dummies, as well as testing fixed and 
random effects models. To assuage any concerns about potential endogeneity in our regressions, 
especially reverse causality, we then use three different approaches that have been widely 
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employed in the empirical literature on the determinants of income inequality: 1) lagging all 
the explanatory variables by one period;
138
 2) two stage least-squares using lagged values (first 
three lags) of our key independent variables (and their interaction) as instruments (IV 
2SLS);
139
 and 3) Arellano–Bond dynamic panel estimators.
140
 The results of the alternative 
specifications are shown in Tables S1 to S6 in the online supplementary materials.
141
 
We also check the robustness of the results to using alternative measures of knowledge 
employment and using a common sample for the inequality measures. Table S7 in the online 
supplementary materials shows the results when we drop the financial intermediation sector 
from our measure of knowledge employment (to help allay any fears financialization is driving 
the main results).
142
 Table S8 shows the results when we use Kwon and Roberts’ alternative, 
occupations-based measure of knowledge employment (to check the results are not specific to 
the measure of knowledge employment used).
143144
 Lastly, Table S9 shows the results when we 
restrict the sample to only the 303 country-years where data is available for both our measures 
of inequality.
145
 
 
V. RESULTS 
The results for the top 1% income share are shown in Table 4. Models 1 to 4 show the results 
from the baseline regressions, which simply include our main independent variables and an 
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interaction term, as well as country-fixed effects. In all four models, knowledge employment is 
positively associated with the income share of the top 1% and significant at the 99% level. The 
interaction effects between knowledge employment and the four labour market institutions are 
all negative, but the effects are only statistically significant for wage coordination, employment 
protection legislation, and bargaining coverage (and not union density). The baseline results 
tentatively support the hypothesis that the presence of strong labour market institutions 
reduces the effect of the transition to the knowledge economy on top incomes shares. 
Models 5 to 8 in Table 4 introduce a full set of control variables. These models take 
account of other important drivers of inequality, covering education, financialization, 
globalization, and the economy. The results show that the effects of the expansion of knowledge 
employment on the income share of the top 1% is conditional on the strength of labour market 
institutions. The interaction effects for all the labour market institutions aside from union 
density are significant, negative, and of a similar magnitude to the baseline regressions. Only 
one of the control variables—stock market capitalisation—is statistically significant across all 
of the models. We find that it is positively associated with top income shares.  
The main effects on the labour market institutions are negative (and mostly statistically 
significant) across all eight models, which suggests that labour market institutions exert a 
negative effect on the top 1% income share at the average level of knowledge employment in 
the sample. This fits with the previous empirical literature on the role of labour market 
institutions in restraining the income growth of the most affluent households.
146
 
The results in Table 5 show the same eight regression models, but with the 90–10 wage 
ratio as the dependent variable. The same patterns emerge for the main independent variables. 
In all eight regression models, knowledge employment is positively associated with the 90–10 
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wage ratio and highly statistically significant. The interaction effects are also negative and 
significant in the baseline models and the models with controls for all four of the labour market 
institutions. Hence, while higher union density was not found to mitigate the effects of the 
knowledge economy on top incomes shares, it is found to moderate the effects on the wider 
income distribution. From Models 5 to 8 in Table 5, we can see that none of our control 
variables exert consistent statistically significant effects on the 90–10 wage ratio. 
Turning to the main effects of labour market institutions on the 90–10 wage ratio, we can 
see that they are mainly statistically insignificant. This does not necessarily undermine 
previous empirical studies that find a negative effect of labour market institutions on the 90–
10 wage ratio,
147
 but it does suggest that the effects of labour market institutions operate 
through a channel that differs from those identified in previous studies. Our results suggest 
the most salient effects of labour market institutions on earnings inequality occur through their 
ability to alleviate the inequality-enhancing effects of the transition to knowledge economy. 
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TABLE 4 
KNOWLEDGE EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS, AND THE INCOME SHARE 
OF THE TOP 1% (PRAIS–WINSTEN REGRESSIONS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Knowledge employment 0.525*** 0.271*** 1.063*** 0.607*** 0.452*** 0.154** 0.746*** 0.783*** 
 (0.072) (0.080) (0.142) (0.160) (0.067) (0.074) (0.131) (0.136) 
Wage coordination -0.001**    -0.001***    
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
Union density  -0.001***    -0.001***   
  (0.000)    (0.000)   
EPL   -0.007*    -0.003  
   (0.004)    (0.003)  
Bargaining coverage    -0.000    -0.000 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -0.059***    -0.078***    
 (0.014)    (0.015)    
Union density *  
Knowledge employment  -0.002    -0.001   
  (0.002)    (0.001)   
EPL *  
Knowledge employment   -0.207***    -0.180***  
   (0.045)    (0.040)  
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment    -0.004**    -0.008*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Education expenditure     0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock market capitalization     0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Private credit     0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Outward FDI     -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Southern import penetration     -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment     -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.098*** (omitted) (omitted) 0.099*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011)   (0.013) 
Observations 538 538 342 503 459 459 300 444 
R
2
 0.573 0.570 0.694 0.551 0.706 0.677 0.830 0.698 
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Note: Prais–Winsten regressions (panel-corrected standard errors and ar(1) corrections) with country fixed effects in all models. 
Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Pairwise option used to compute the covariance matrix. Knowledge employment is 
mean centred and comprises three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; and renting of machinery and 
equipment and other business activities. 
* 
P < 0.1, 
** 
P < 0.05 and 
*** 
P < 0.01. 
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TABLE 5 
KNOWLEDGE EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS, AND THE 90–10 WAGE 
RATIO (PRAIS–WINSTEN REGRESSIONS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Knowledge employment 7.935*** 4.671*** 8.465*** 7.694*** 7.779*** 5.950*** 7.176*** 8.818*** 
 (0.912) (1.410) (2.139) (1.466) (1.187) (1.669) (2.255) (1.638) 
Wage coordination -0.009    -0.003    
 (0.008)    (0.009)    
Union density  -0.007**    0.000   
  (0.003)    (0.004)   
EPL   -0.032    0.067  
   (0.092)    (0.086)  
Bargaining coverage    -0.000    0.001 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -1.576***    -1.653***    
 (0.249)    (0.289)    
Union density *  
Knowledge employment  -0.058**    -0.075***   
  (0.022)    (0.024)   
EPL *  
Knowledge employment   -2.675***    -2.366***  
   (0.892)    (0.891)  
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment    -0.070***    -0.083*** 
    (0.020)    (0.019) 
Education expenditure     -0.005 -0.004 0.031** -0.001 
     (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
Stock market capitalization     0.052* 0.054* 0.017 0.044 
     (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) 
Private credit     -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Outward FDI     -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Southern import penetration     0.001 0.003 0.006* -0.001 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployment     -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 3.543*** 3.623*** 4.489*** 2.709*** (omitted) 2.462*** 3.824*** 2.361*** 
 (0.056) (0.068) (0.404) (0.183)  (0.297) (0.413) (0.282) 
Observations 320 320 255 314 275 275 216 270 
R
2
 0.958 0.955 0.969 0.958 0.960 0.957 0.973 0.962 
Countries 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 16 
Note: Prais–Winsten regressions (panel-corrected standard errors and ar(1) corrections) with country fixed effects in all models. 
Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Pairwise option used to compute the covariance matrix. Knowledge employment is 
mean centred comprises three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; and renting of machinery and equipment 
and other business activities. 
* 
P < 0.1, 
** 
P < 0.05 and 
*** 
P < 0.01.
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To get a clearer picture of the magnitude of the mitigating effects of labour market institutions, 
Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated effects of a one percentage point increase in employment 
in knowledge-intensive services on our two measures of inequality, when our labour market 
institutions are at the minimum and maximum values observed in the sample (see Table 3). 
We do not include union density in the figure for the top 1% income share as the interaction 
effect was not statistically significant (see Table 4). We can see from Figure 2 that for the 
income share of the top 1%, an increase in knowledge employment is associated with an 
increase in inequality when wage coordination and collective bargaining coverage are very 
weak, and little or no effect when they are at their highest levels. Employment protection 
legislation exhibits a similar pattern, but the expansion of the knowledge economy is found to 
reduce inequality when employment protection is extremely strict. However, this finding should 
be taken with a pinch of salt, as the maximum value for EPL pertains only to Portugal between 
1985 and 1989. Outside of those country-years, EPL is rarely above 3 in our sample. At 3, the 
estimated effect of a one percentage point increase in knowledge employment on the top 1% 
income share would be small and positive, and hence, more in line with the results for wage 
coordination and bargaining coverage. 
Similar patterns emerge for the 90–10 wage ratio in Figure 3. The effect of the expansion 
of the knowledge economy on inequality is positive when labour market institutions are weak, 
but negligible (or negative) when they are strong. Again, the same caveat applies to the EPL 
findings. At EPL of 3, the effect on the 90–10 wage ratio of an expansion of knowledge 
employment is also small and positive. Overall, these marginal effects figures highlight the role 
that strong labour market institutions can have in mitigating the inequality associated with 
the transition to the knowledge economy.
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FIGURE 2 
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE INCOME SHARE OF THE TOP 1% OF A ONE 
PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN THE SHARE OF KNOWLEDGE EMPLOYMENT 
Source: Author’s calculations; for data sources for the underlying regression analysis, see Table A3 in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE 90–10 WAGE RATIO OF A ONE PERCENTAGE 
POINT INCREASE IN THE SHARE OF KNOWLEDGE EMPLOYMENT 
Source: Author’s calculations; for data sources for the underlying regression analysis, see Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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The results of the alternative specifications and robustness tests are shown in Tables S1 to S9 
of the online supplementary materials.
148
 We can see that the main results of the analysis are 
largely unaffected by the empirical strategy chosen. The variables of theoretical interest exhibit 
the same relationships when we include decade dummies to our Prais–Winsten regressions 
(Table S1) or when we use fixed effects (Table S2) or random effects (Table S3) models. Similar 
to the main results, the only interaction effect that is not consistently statistically significant 
and negative is that between knowledge employment and union density in the top 1% income 
shares regressions. 
The empirical strategies in Tables S4 to S6 of the online supplementary materials aim to 
assuage any fears that endogeneity is unduly influencing the results in the main analysis.
149
 
The model with all the dependent variables lagged by one period and the IV 2SLS model 
strongly reinforce the results from our baseline Prais-Winsten regressions. The same key 
independent variables are statistically significant and the coefficients are of broadly the same 
magnitude (although the knowledge economy exerts a slightly larger effect on the 90–10 wage 
ratio in the instrumental variables models). In the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel estimation, 
the main results are substantively comparable, but less of the interaction effects are 
statistically significant. The interaction effect on wage coordination is negative and significant 
for both measures of inequality, as well as bargaining coverage for the top 1% income share 
and union density for the 90–10 wage ratio. 
Across all the alternative specifications stock market capitalization is found to exert a 
consistently statistically significant positive effect on the top 1% income share, just as in the 
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main results, but unlike the main results, it is also positively associated with the 90–10 wage 
ratio across many of the alternative specifications. 
Tables S7 and S8 of the online supplementary materials show that the results are also 
robust to using different measures of the knowledge economy, which gives us confidence that 
our analysis is capturing the theoretical mechanisms we have identified, rather than any 
competing explanations, such as financialization.
150
 Lastly, Table S9 shows that the results are 
robust to using a common sample for our inequality measures.
151
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The study of the distribution of income, especially income inequality, is central to comparative 
political economy, and it has only risen in salience as labour market stratification has increased 
during the post-industrial era.
152
 Our findings make a valuable contribution to many of the 
key debates in comparative political economy on the knowledge economy, labour market 
institutions, and income inequality. 
Baccaro and Howell’s seminal work on liberalization argues that the industrial relations 
systems of the advanced capitalist economies have been transformed in a common neoliberal 
direction since the 1990s, which has undermined the egalitarian model of negotiated 
capitalism.
153
 While it is clear from our dataset that the post-industrial era has seen substantial 
liberalization in the industrial relations arena, our findings suggest that differences in the 
strength of labour market institutions across countries remain an important driver of cross-
country differences in income inequality. 
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The results of our study also push back against Iversen and Soskice’s claim that due to 
the lack of complementarities between low- and high-skilled workers in the knowledge 
economy, industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity.
154
 
We find strong evidence that industrial relations continue to be important, but our results are 
in no way dependent on contemporary industrial relations systems being underpinned by the 
complementarities and coalitions of the Fordist era. Like Kathleen Thelen, we view industrial 
relations systems as dynamic and open to reformulation. She argues that it is precisely where 
industrial relations systems have adapted—in both form and function—to the challenges of 
the knowledge economy that they have been most able to uphold egalitarian outcomes.
155
 For 
example, Denmark has one of the lowest levels of inequality in the advanced democracies (see 
Figure S1 in the online supplementary materials), but their current model of ‘supply-side’ 
solidarity is a far cry from the wage levelling approaches that the Danish unions pursued in 
the Fordist era. The dominant interests in the union movement now stretch beyond traditional 
blue-collar workers to include the salaried employees of the knowledge-intensive service sectors 
and the unions push hard for both labour market flexibility and rights to education and 
training, as they prize equality of opportunity over equality of outcomes.
156
 
A particularly consistent finding in our empirical analysis is that wage coordination can 
mitigate the effects of the transition to the knowledge economy on income inequality. On the 
surface, this may appear in conflict with recent contributions that point to wage coordination, 
and coordinated capitalism more generally, no longer necessarily being associated with greater 
equality across the workforce.
157
 These contributions tend to focus on the bottom half of the 
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income distribution, however, so unlike our measures of inequality, do not take adequate 
account of the effects of wage coordination on restraining earnings higher up the income 
distribution. In addition, we find strong evidence that union density and bargaining coverage 
also dampen the inequality-inducing effects of the transition to the knowledge economy, 
especially for the 90–10 wage ratio, which chimes with the common argument in this strand of 
the literature that egalitarian outcomes in the knowledge economy are concentrated in 
countries with more inclusive and encompassing industrial relations systems (for a given level 
of wage coordination).
158
 
The only interaction effect in our analysis that was not consistently statistically significant 
and negative was that between union density and knowledge employment in the top 1% income 
shares regressions. This finding does not contradict the existing empirical literature that finds 
that union density helps contain the rise of top incomes,
159
 however, as the coefficient on union 
density itself is consistently statistically significant and negative across our regression models. 
Higher union density therefore directly reduces the top 1% income share rather than mitigating 
the effects of the transition to the knowledge economy (as the other labour market institutions 
do). This shows that the effect of unions on executive compensation stretches across the 
economy and is not confined to knowledge-intensive service sectors. 
   Looking beyond the key independent variables, only stock market capitalisation exhibited 
consistent, statistically significant effects across the alternative specifications in our analysis. 
This supports the voluminous empirical literature on the importance of financialization for 
income inequality.
160
 It also hints at the specific mechanisms that might be at work, such as 
the increasing use of stock options as CEO compensation over the post-Fordist period and the 
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gains to management and owners (and the losses to rank-and-file production workers) from 
the shift to shareholder-value orientated models of corporate governance. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ICT revolution and the transition to the knowledge economy in the advanced democracies 
has created winners and losers. Workers with university education and the most affluent 
households have reaped much of the gains, often at the expense of those workers lower down 
the income distribution with jobs that can be easily substituted by machines and computers. 
The dominant narrative in the emerging comparative political economy literature on the 
knowledge economy is that the complementarities between skilled and semi-skilled workers 
that underpinned industrial relations systems in the Fordist era have been so undermined by 
the ICT revolution that strong labour market institutions are no longer the main guarantor of 
wage solidarity across the labour force.
161
 
Our empirical analysis of 18 advanced democracies between 1970 and 2007 challenges that 
argument by showing that the presence of strong labour market institutions played an 
important role in mitigating the upward pressure on income inequality from the transition to 
the knowledge economy. We find that the effects of expanding knowledge employment on both 
the income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 wage ratio are moderated by more coordinated 
wage bargaining, stricter employment protection legislation, and higher bargaining coverage. 
Additionally, we find that union density mitigates the effects of the transition to the knowledge 
economy on the 90–10 wage ratio, but not on the top 1% income share. Our results complement 
the wider empirical literature that finds that industrial relations systems and the power of 
organized labour can limit wage dispersion across the workforce and constrain the income 
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growth of the most affluent households in society.
162
 However, we go beyond the previous 
literature by showing that labour market institutions effects in the post-industrial era operated 
through their capacity to counteract the pressures on wage solidarity arising from the rapid 
expansion of knowledge-intensive service sectors. 
The analysis presented in this paper has several important limitations that point to fruitful 
avenues for future work. The Prais–Winsten regression models pin down the importance of 
labour market institutions for mitigating the inequality effects of the transition to the 
knowledge economy, but have a limited amount to say about the underlying mechanisms. Our 
cross-country comparative analysis would therefore be nicely complemented by micro-level 
empirical analyses or qualitative case study analyses into how labour market institutions have 
interacted with the expansion of knowledge employment to ensure greater wage solidarity in 
Scandinavia and some parts of continental Europe than elsewhere. The extent to which 
producer groups have adapted their strategies and forms of coordination in the knowledge 
economy is also hard to ascertain from the high-level, national measures of labour market 
institutions used in this study, and requires further investigation. Lastly, the advanced 
democracies vary not only in their expansion of knowledge-intensive services, but also in other 
aspects of their economic structure, such as the prevalence of employment in low-skilled, 
interpersonal services and the extent to which they have been able to preserve traditional 
manufacturing jobs. It is a clear challenge for future CPE work on the knowledge economy to 
bring together insights on the distributive implications of the full spectrum of structural 
changes that have taken place since the 1970s, and to work towards a more unified conceptual 
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framework for analysing the effects of structural change on income inequality in the advanced 
democracies. 
This paper makes an important contribution to the growing body of comparative work 
that looks at how national institutions can condition the effects of major economic changes on 
income inequality in advanced democracies.
163
 We provide evidence against the argument that 
labour market institutions are redundant in the knowledge economy; in fact, we find that they 
play a central role in alleviating the upward pressure on income inequality arising from the 
continued march of workers in advanced democracies into knowledge-intensive service sectors. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
COUNTRY-YEAR COVERAGE FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Country Income share of the top 1% 90–10 wage ratio 
Australia 1970 - 2007 1975 - 2007 
Austria — 2004 - 2007 
Belgium — 1999 - 2007 
Canada 1970 - 2007 1997 - 2007 
Denmark 1970 - 2007 1996 - 2007 
Finland 1970 - 2007 1977 - 2007 
France 1970 - 2007 1995 - 2007 
Germany 1971 - 2007 1992 - 2007 
Greece — 2004 - 2007 
Ireland 1975 - 2007 1994 - 2007 
Italy 1974 - 2007 1986 - 2007 
Japan 1970 - 2007 1975 - 2007 
Netherlands 1970 - 2007 2002 - 2007 
Portugal 1976 - 2005 2004 - 2007 
Spain 1981 - 2007 2004 - 2007 
Sweden 1970 - 2007 1975 - 2007 
United Kingdom 1970 - 2007 1970 - 2007 
United States 1970 - 2007 1973 - 2007 
 
 
TABLE A2 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Top 1% income share              
2. 90–10 wage ratio 0.779             
3. Knowledge 
employment  
0.442 0.393           
 
4. Wage coordination -0.414 -0.521 -0.223          
 
5. Union density -0.594 -0.714 -0.302 0.412          
6. EPL -0.502 -0.634 -0.516 0.298 0.069         
7. Bargaining coverage -0.610 -0.729 -0.198 0.387 0.408 0.648        
8. Education 
expenditure 
-0.167 -0.218 0.357 -0.079 0.412 -0.178 0.001      
 
9. Stock market 
capitalization 
0.447 0.341 0.616 -0.225 -0.142 -0.432 -0.375 0.161     
 
10. Private credit 0.591 0.418 0.438 -0.124 -0.380 -0.322 -0.559 0.036 0.418    
 
11. Outward FDI 0.119 -0.124 0.462 0.076 0.046 -0.030 0.114 0.139 0.419 0.150   
 
12. Southern import 
penetration 
-0.180 -0.209 0.449 0.252 0.330 0.031 0.356 0.425 0.204 0.010 0.512  
 
13. Unemployment rate -0.049 -0.064 0.140 -0.211 -0.127 0.077 0.176 0.075 -0.091 -0.137 0.009 0.109 
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TABLE A3 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Variable description Source 
Top 1% income 
share 
Top 1% income share, based on pre-tax incomes 
Alvaredo et al. (2016); World Wealth & Income 
Database (data accessed September 2017) 
90–10 wage ratio 
Ratio of gross earnings received by a worker at 
the 90th earnings percentile to that received by a 
worker at the 10th percentile 
Brady, Huber and Stephens (2014); OECD Labour 
Force Statistics (accessed 14 Jan 2013) 
Knowledge 
employment  
(% of total 
employment) 
Employment in dynamic services as a share of 
total employment (using Wren’s 2013 definition 
of dynamic services) 
EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: 
November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)  
Alternative 
measure of 
knowledge 
employment 
Number of workers in the knowledge sector (as a 
% of total labour force). Kwon and Roberts’ 
(2015) measure combines managers, 
professionals, technicians and associate 
professionals (variable categorized using 1988 
version of ISCO) 
International Labour Organization (data kindly 
provided by Roy Kwon; measure also used in Kwon 
and Roberts (2015)) 
Wage coordination  
(1 – 5 scale) 
Coordination of wage-setting  
(1-5 scale) — a measure of the degree of 
coordination, ranging from firm-level bargaining 
(1) to fully centralized bargaining (5) 
J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.1. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam. 
September 2016 
Union density (%)  
The ratio of wage and salary earners that are 
trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners 
OECD and J. Visser, ICTWSS database 
(Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-
2010), version 3.0 (http://www.uva-aias.net/) 
EPL (0 – 6 scale) 
Strictness of employment protection: individual 
and collective dismissals (regular contracts) (0-6 
scale) — higher values denote stricter regulation 
OECD Labour Force Statistics (data accessed June 
2017) 
Bargaining 
coverage  
(0 - 100) 
Employees covered by collective (wage) 
bargaining agreements as a % of all wage and 
salary earners in employment with the right to 
bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for 
the possibility that some sectors or occupations 
are excluded from the right to bargain 
J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.1. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam. 
September 2016. 
Education 
expenditure  
(% of GNI) 
Adjusted savings: education expenditure  
(% of GNI) 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(data accessed September 2017) 
Stock market 
capitalization 
(% of GDP) 
Stock market capitalization: market value of 
publicly listed stocks divided by GDP 
Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) 
Private credit  
(% of GDP) 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions (as a % of GDP) 
Financial Development and Structure Dataset (June 
2017 version); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000, 2009) Čihák et al. (2012) 
Outward FDI  
(% of GDP) 
Outward foreign direct investment  
(as a % of GDP) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Foreign Direct Investment 
Database (data accessed September 2017) 
Southern import 
penetration  
(% of GDP) 
Southern import penetration: value of 
manufacturing imports from developing 
economies (SITC REV 1. 5-8) as a % of GDP 
United Nations COMTRADE Database (data kindly 
provided by Roy Kwon; measure also used in Kwon 
and Roberts (2015)) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Rate of unemployment as a % of the civilian 
labour force 
OECD Labour Force Statistics (data accessed 
September 2017) 
 
